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Intelectual Property
by Laurence P. Colton*
I.

INTRODUCTION

This Article surveys legal developments in the area of intellectual
property relevant to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit during the 2013 calendar year, particularly as decided by the
United States federal court system, because intellectual property law
primarily is determined under federal law. The past year, 2013, was
relatively unusual in that the United States Supreme Court ruled on
several cases across the intellectual property spectrum, and the last
remaining provisions of the federal America Invents Act (AIA) came
into effect. Therefore, this year's Article is unique in that it focuses on
law that not only applies in the Eleventh Circuit, but across the entire
nation.
Intellectual property law comprises several discrete yet overlapping
areas of law. The four primary areas of intellectual property law
historically have been patent law, trademark law, copyright law, and
trade secret law. Because the basis for patent law and copyright law is
provided in the United States Constitution,2 patent and copyright cases
and statutes are based in federal law and are for the most part litigated
in federal courts. As trademark law and trade secret law have both

* Member of the firm of Smith Risley Tempel Santos LLC, Atlanta, Georgia. Tufts
University (B.S.Ch.E., 1982); Emory University School of Law (J.D., 1987). Member, State
Bar of Georgia. Registered to practice before the United States Patent and Trademark
Office (USPTO).
1. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 125 Stat. 284-341 (2011) (codified at
35 U.S.C.).
2. Article 1, Section 8, Clause 8 of the United States Constitution provides that "[tihe
Congress shall have Power ... [tjo promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. Authors and Writings refers to
copyright, and Inventors and Discoveries refers to patent.
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federal 3 and state aspects, trademark and trade secret cases and
statutes are based on federal or state law, and these statutes and cases
are litigated in both federal and state courts.
I have not attempted to include all cases, statutes, and events that
touch upon intellectual property, but instead have selected drivers that
are of more significance or interest or that may indicate a particular
direction in the relevant areas of law. While the drivers discussed
herein often have multiple issues, I have reported only on the more
relevant or interesting intellectual property issues.
II.

THE AMERICA INVENTS ACT

The AIA contains the most comprehensive and significant changes
made to title 35 of the United States Code" since 1952 and was a
primary driver for intellectual property in 2013. Signed into law by
President Barack Obama on September 16, 2011, the AIA has thirtyseven sections containing changes to many aspects of the United States
patent laws, all of which are of great interest to the intellectual property
legal world. The AIA contains a general effective date provision, which
states that except as otherwise provided, the provisions of the AIA took
effect on September 16, 2011, and apply to any patent issued on or after
that effective date.s Thus, these provisions have had an effect on patent
law throughout 2013.
As discussed in a previous article,' the AIA includes significant
changes to the United States patent laws. The last of the provisions to
take effect did so on March 16, 2013, and (a) changed from the first-toinvent to the first-inventor-to-file; (b) broadened the scope of prior art;
and (c) added a post-grant opposition procedure.'
A.

First Inventor to File
First, the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)
instituted the first-inventor-to-file system, replacing the previous first-to-

3. Article 1, Section 8, Clause 3 of the United States Constitution is the Commerce
Clause, which forms the constitutional basis for federal trademark and unfair competition
legislation and provides that "[tihe Congress shall have Power ... [tlo regulate Commerce
with foreign Nations, and among the several States . . . ." U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
4. 35 U.S.C. chs. 1-4 (2012) are the United States Code chapters that provide the laws
for the USPTO.
5. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act § 35, 125 Stat. at 341.
6. Laurence P. Colton, Intellectual Property,Eleventh Circuit Survey, 63 MERCER L.
REV. 1283, 1283-1308 (2012).
7. See infra notes 8-31 and accompanying text.
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invent system.' Under this system, invention and patent application
priority is determined by the patent application's effective filing date,
which is the date the United States patent application was filed or the
filing date of the earliest application from which the United States
patent application claims priority, such as a prior filed foreign country
application' or a Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) international patent
application."o Now, the "race to the patent office" is a reality. In the
past, the patent was granted to the first person to invent regardless of
the patent application filing date; now the patent is granted to the first
inventor to file a patent application regardless of the date of inventorship." This also means inventors will no longer be able to "swear
behind" the application or invention date of a later inventor by proving
to the USPTO that they were the first to conceive of the invention. 2
One way to avoid the first-inventor-to-file provision of the AIA is to
claim priority to a patent application filed before March 16, 2013."
Non-provisional patent applications filed on or after March 16, 2013 will
remain under the prior first-to-invent rule if they claim priority to a
patent application" that was filed before March 16, 2013 and contain
the same material as the priority application." If the non-provisional
patent application filed on or after March 16, 2013 includes new
material not contained in the priority application, the patent application
will be subject to the AIA and its first-inventor-to-file rule and other
procedures.16

B. Broadening the Scope of PriorArt
Second, the scope of prior art used in determining the novelty or
obviousness of an invention disclosed in a patent application was
broadened to remove prior geographic limitations. 1 7 Section 3 of the
AIA also simplifies the definitions of what constitutes prior art. In

8. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2012).
9. 35 U.S.C. § 119 (2012).
10. Id.
11. 35 U.S.C. § 102.
12. 37 C.F.R. § 1.131 (2013).
13. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a).
14. This is generally termed a "priority application."
15. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a).
16. See id.
17. "Prior art" is the body of knowledge currently in existence, and is applied by the
USPTO examiners when examining a patent application for patentability. Because two of
the criteria for patentability are that the invention must be "new" and "non-obvious" in
view of the prior art, what constitutes prior art obviously is important to the inventor. See
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act § 3(c), 285 Stat. at 287.
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effect, by eliminating several exceptions to what constitutes prior art,
most prior art now will be considered as a bar to patentability." For
example, the AIA expands the scope of materials that may be considered
prior art by eliminating from 35 U.S.C. § 102 the "in this country" limit
on prior art, resulting in the ability to attack any patent or patent
application by evidence of prior public use of the invention anywhere in
the world.' 9 Previously, prior art available in the United States was
treated differently than prior art available outside of the United States
or in a different language. 20 Now, there are no longer any geographic
requirements for prior art for applications filed on or after March 16,
2013, and prior art can come from anywhere in the world and be in any

language.21
There are two important exceptions to the AIA broadened prior art
rule. The first is that prior art disclosures made publicly available one
year or less before the effective filing date of the patent application can
be overcome by a showing that the prior art disclosure was by a person
who obtained the subject matter from the applicant,22 or the applicant
publicly disclosed the subject matter ("derived") before the date of the
prior art disclosure.' The second exception is that applicants can now
rely on common ownership or joint research agreement provisions to
overcome prior art rejections.24 However, the term "derived" has yet to
be interpreted by the courts, and therefore the first exception should not
be relied upon as of this Article.

C. Adding a Post-GrantReview Procedure
Third, section 6 of the AIA introduces a post-grant review period.2 5
Under the new post-grant review system, any third party may file a
request to cancel patent claims as unpatentable by asserting an
invalidity argument and providing evidence to support the assertion.26
Previously, post-grant review of the patentability of patent claims only
occurred in very limited and arguably archaic instances and were only
based on prior art under 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 and 103.27 These limitations

18. See 35 U.S.C. § 102.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

See id.
Id.
Id.
35 U.S.C. § 102(bX1XA).
35 U.S.C. § 102(bX1)(XB).
35 U.S.C. § 102(c).

25. 35 U.S.C. § 321 (2012).
26. 35 U.S.C. §§ 321-22 (2012).
27. The instances are the following: (1) when an applicant files an application to reissue
a patent and requests correction of at least one error in the patent; (2) when an inter-
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on third party involvement effectively prevented the public from
challenging patents except by way of an expensive and lengthy civil suit.
Now, anyone who has not first initiated a civil action will be able to
challenge a patent through a post-grant review.2 ' To prevent concurrent actions, the AIA includes provisions preventing a post-grant review
if a civil action is already pending and for staying a civil action if a postgrant review has already commenced.2 ' For a post-grant review to be
granted by the USPTO, the petitioner must request the post-grant
review within nine months after the patent is granted and demonstrate
that it is more likely than not that one of the patent claims is unpatentable.o After a post-grant review has concluded, the petitioner is
estopped from raising grounds of invalidity in civil actions before the
United States federal district courts, before the USPTO, or before the
United States International Trade Commission (ITC) that were not
raised during the post-grant review proceeding."
The new post-grant review process provides two very important
changes. First, the public now can be more easily involved in the
patenting process to assist in preventing unpatentable devices or
processes from being patented. Second, once the post-grant review has
been carried out and a patent found to be valid, it is more difficult to get
that proverbial "second bite at the apple" in trying to invalidate a
patent.
III. CASE LAW
Several important case decisions were handed down by the United
States Supreme Court in 2013 in the intellectual property arena. I will
touch upon several of the more interesting case decisions in four of the
primary areas of intellectual property.

ference is declared between the patent and a pending application, and the applicant in the
interference seeks judgment based on unpatentability of patent claims; (3) when a patent
owner or a third party requests reexamination of the patent; and (4) when the director of
the USPTO initiates reexamination of a patent on his or her own initiative. See 35 U.S.C.
§§ 102-03.

28. 35 U.S.C. § 321.
29. 35 U.S.C. § 325 (2012).
30. Post GrantReview, UNITED STATEs PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFIcE, http-//www.uspto.gov/aia implementation/faqs post-grant~review.jsp (last visited May 7, 2014).

31. Id.
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A.

Patent
Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc.32
involved the question of the patent eligibility of human DNA sequences. 33 In short, in a unanimous decision, the United States Supreme
Court held that naturally occurring isolated DNA is not patent-eligible
because it is a product of nature, while synthetically created DNA, called
complementary DNA (cDNA), is patent-eligible because it is not
naturally occurring."' Myriad is one of the most significant biotechnology patent cases in recent memory and involved Myriad's patents on
isolated DNA sequences known as BRCA1 and BRCA2, which are the
genes associated with a predisposition to breast and ovarian cancer."
In 2012, Myriad's patents on the isolated, naturally occurring BRCA1
and BRCA2 genes were ruled invalid by the United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York.36 Myriad appealed to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which held that
The
isolated DNA sequences were eligible for patent protection.
Association for Molecular Pathology (AMP) petitioned for certiorari to
the United States Supreme Court, which vacated the Federal Circuit's
ruling and remanded the case for review" in light of the Supreme
Court's 2012 decision in Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus
Laboratories,Inc.3 On remand, the Federal Circuit again ruled4 0 in
favor of Myriad and held that isolated DNA sequences were patenteligible because it was not solely a natural phenomenon, but rather a
specific application of that phenomenon."
The question decided on certiorari by the Supreme Court was whether
an isolated DNA sequence is a new and useful chemical matter that can
only exist as a result of human invention.42 The Court held that a
patent was not available for isolated DNA sequences, which are "specific

32. 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013).
33. Id. at 2111.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 2112.
36. Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 702 F. Supp. 2d
181, 185 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
37. Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 689 F.3d 1303,
1309 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
38. Myriad, 133 S. Ct. at 2114.
39. 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012).
40. Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 628 F.3d 1347, 1349 (Fed. Cir.
2010).
41. Id. at 1354.
42. Myriad, 133 S. Ct. at 2111.
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segments of DNA-for instance, a particular gene or part of a gene-that
can then be further studied, manipulated, or used."' Overall, the
ruling in Myriad may be considered relatively straightforward-the
Court held that DNA, which is a naturally occurring molecule identical
to that found in the human body, is not patent-eligible, while cDNA,
which is a synthetic molecule that does not occur naturally, is patenteligible."
Bowman v. Monsanto Co. 45 considered whether the doctrine of patent
exhaustion" is applicable in using a second generation of genetically
modified seeds obtained from plants grown from a first generation of
patented genetically modified seeds.47 In short, in a unanimous
decision, the United States Supreme Court held that the doctrine of
patent exhaustion does not allow a farmer to reproduce subsequent
generations of patented seeds from plants grown from prior purchased
patented seeds." This case stems from Monsanto's patent lawsuit
against a farmer, Bowman, who purchased seeds from a local grain
elevator. Some of the seeds happened to be genetically modified seeds
that were patented by Monsanto for their resistance to many types of
herbicides, including Monsanto's own brand, Roundup@.
Monsanto's license prohibited farmers who used the patented seeds
from using seeds from their harvest for future crops; however, as noted
above, Bowman had not purchased the seeds from Monsanto. Bowman
planted the seeds, sprayed the plants with Roundup@ herbicide, and
harvested seeds from the surviving plants. Monsanto sued Bowman for
having the harvested seeds."o
In the United States District Court for the Southern District of
Indiana, Bowman argued that Monsanto's patent rights in the original
seeds obtained from the grain elevator-seeds that were harvested by
other farmers-had been exhausted." The district court found in favor

43. Id. at 2112, 2120.
44. Id. at 2119.
45. 133 S. Ct. 1761 (2013).
46. Patent exhaustion is a doctrine that eliminates the right to control or prohibits the
use of an invention after there has been an authorized sale of the invention. This is based
on the premise that once a person legitimately purchases a patented device, that person
should be able to use the device without fear of being sued for patent infringement. See
generally Bowman, 133 S. Ct. at 1766.
47. Id. at 1764.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 1765.
50. Id. at 1764-65.
51. Monsanto Co. v. Bowman, 686 F. Supp. 2d 834, 836 (S.D. Ind. 2009).
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of Monsanto and awarded damages.52 The Federal Circuit affirmed,
holding that Monsanto's patent rights were not exhausted when
harvested seeds containing the patented trait were sold as a commodity.53
The issue in this case was not whether Bowman could have used seeds
purchased from Monsanto, but whether Bowman could use later
generations of seeds harvested from the plants grown from seeds that
were purchased from Monsanto." The Supreme Court held that the
second generation seeds were not subject to the patent exhaustion
doctrine." The second (and later) generation of seeds could not be used
to grow plants, which in turn would make more seeds, because then
farmers would "need only buy the seed once, whether from Monsanto, a
competitor, or (as here) a grain elevator."56 In effect, the Court held
that if patent exhaustion applied, a farmer would only need to buy one
seed, "each time profiting from the patented seed without compensating
its inventor." Thus, the Court added clarification to the "make, use,
offer to sell, or sell" provision" of the United States patent laws.
Gunn v. Minton5 1 involved the question of Federal Circuit jurisdiction
over state law claims concerning patent malpractice.o In a unanimous
decision, the United States Supreme Court held that state legal
malpractice claims based on underlying patent matters will rarely, if
ever, arise under federal patent law jurisdiction.61 In other words,
malpractice claims do not arise under the United States patent laws 6 2
and are not amenable to exclusive federal jurisdiction. Gunn dealt with
a jurisdictional issue of whether federal or state courts should hear
malpractice claims in patent cases, but did not involve an issue
regarding the patent itself." The Federal Circuit had previously held
that such cases were subject to federal jurisdiction because they required
an interpretation of United States patent law."4

52. Id. at 840.
53. Monsanto Co. v. Bowman, 657 F.3d 1341, 1347-48 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
54. See Bowman, 133 S. Ct. at 1766-67.
55. Id. at 1764.
56. Id. at 1767.
57. Id.
58. 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2012).
59. 133 S. Ct. 1059 (2013).
60. Id. at 1062.
61. Id. at 1065; 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (2012).
62. 35 U.S.C. The United States patent laws provide for exclusive federal jurisdiction
for issues arising thereunder. Id.
63. See Gunn, 133 S. Ct. at 1062.
64. See Minton v. Natl Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 336 F.3d 1373, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
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The United States Supreme Court held that a malpractice claim based
on alleged faulty patent prosecution did not involve a real question of
patent law but rather an ancillary question, and therefore was not a
"substantial" patent issue in terms of its impact on federal patent
law.65 In effect, the Court decided that allowing state courts to address
hypothetical questions regarding malpractice claims does not interfere
with the federal court's power to decide substantive patent issues
because the state court's decisions are not binding on federal courts. 66
This decision helps to clarify those issues that are substantially related
to patent law-and therefore under the exclusive jurisdiction of the
federal courts-as opposed to those issues that are ancillary to patent
law-and therefore can be decided on the state court level.
Federal ')ade Commission v. Actavis, Inc. 67 involved the question of
whether "reverse payment" pharmaceutical patent litigation settlements
are subject to antitrust scrutiny under the rule of reason." In a split
decision, the United States Supreme Court held that such agreements
are subject to antitrust scrutiny under the rule of reason, but did not go
so far to hold that such agreements violate antitrust laws.69
A typical settlement agreement in a patent lawsuit generally includes
a payment from the alleged infringer to the patent owner for past
royalties, and possibly for future royalties, if the settlement agreement
includes a license."o However, in pharmaceutical cases involving an
allegedly infringing generic version of a patented drug, the settlement
agreement often involves a payment made by the patent owner to the
generic drug manufacturer to not compete for a period of time." As
generic drugs often sell for less than brand-name drugs, this payment
can have the look and feel of an agreement that will affect the market
price and thus at least raise the possibility of involving an antitrust
issue.7
The United States Supreme Court disagreed with the Eleventh
Circuit's decision that such an agreement is "immune from antitrust
attack so long as its anticompetitive effects fall within the scope of the
exclusionary potential of the patent"" and opined that such reverse
payment settlements could allow holders of invalid patents to neverthe-

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Gunn, 133 S. Ct. at 1065-66.
See id. at 1065.
133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013).
Id. at 2227, 2237.
See id. at 2227, 2238.
See id. at 2232.
Id. at 2227.
See id. at 2232.
FTC v. Watson Pharms, Inc., 677 F.3d 1298, 1312 (11th Cir. 2012).
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less control the market or allow holders of valid patents to extend their
control beyond the patent." Although the Court did not hold outright
that such reverse-payment settlements are violations of antitrust law,
the Court did hold that such settlements are subject to antitrust scrutiny
under the rule of reason, meaning that the complaining party has the
burden of showing that any anti-competitive effects of such settlements
outweigh any pro-competitive effects."

B.

Copyright

Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc.," involved the question of
whether the first-sale doctrine in copyright law applied to works of
authorship lawfully made outside the United States and then resold in
the United States.7 7 In a split decision, the United States Supreme
Court held that the sale of lawfully made works of authorship purchased
overseas were protected by the first-sale doctrine, and that the protections and exceptions offered by the United States Copyright Act 78 to
lawfully made works of authorship are not limited by geography. 7 1
Supap Kirtsaeng, a foreign student attending graduate school in the
United States, had his family and friends send him textbooks produced
by Wiley Asia that he subsequently resold in the United States for a
profit. The Wiley Asia textbooks were sold in Asia at prices lower than
the same or equivalent books sold in the United States by John Wiley &
Sons. John Wiley & Sons sued Kirtsaeng for copyright infringement. In
his answer, Kirtsaeng raised the first-sale doctrine as a defense. The
district court found that the first-sale doctrine was inapplicable to goods
manufactured outside the United States and found Kirtsaeng liable for
copyright infringement. The United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit affirmed."
Under § 106 of the United States Copyright Act,8 ' the owner of a
copyrighted work enjoys a limited number of exclusive rights, including

74. See Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2227.
75. Id. at 2237.
76. 133 S. Ct. 1351 (2013).
77. Id. at 1355. The first-sale doctrine in copyright law is similar to the patentexhaustion doctrine in patent law. The first-sale doctrine allows the later sale or transfer
of legitimately purchased copyrighted items without permission from the copyright holder.
The first sale doctrine applies to all goods, regardless of where they originated. 17 U.S.C.
§ 109 (2012).
78. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012).
79. Kirtsaeng, 133 S. Ct. at 1370.
80. Id. at 1356-57.

81. 17 U.S.C. § 106.
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82
the right to transfer ownership to the public by way of a sale. These
exclusive rights are limited by the first-sale doctrine of § 109," which
provides that a lawful owner of a copyrighted work has the right to
dispose of that copy without the authority of the copyright owner."
The primary issue in this case was the importation provision of § 602(a)(1),8 which prohibits importation of a work acquired outside the United
States without the authority of the copyright owner."
The lower courts held that the first-sale doctrine was inapplicable to
foreign-manufactured books, finding that the § 109 first-sale doctrine-which applies to books lawfully made under the United States
Copyright Act-and the § 602(a)(1) importation prohibition could only
coexist if foreign-manufactured books were not considered to be lawfully
made under the United States Copyright Act." Thus, applying the
first-sale doctrine to goods produced internationally would render
§ 602(a)(1) meaningless." The Supreme Court disagreed, in effect
determining that books would be considered lawfully made under the
United States Copyright Act, even if not made in the United States, and
are subject to the § 109 first sale doctrine. 89 In this decision, the Court
clarified that if a work is made outside the United States and qualifies
for protection under the United States copyright laws, then at least
§ 109 of the United States copyright laws will apply to that work,
possibly leading to the assumption that the remainder of the United
States copyright laws also will apply.9 o

Thademark

C.

Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc." involved the impact of a covenant not to
sue on declaratory judgment jurisdiction in trademark cases.92 In a
unanimous decision, the United States Supreme Court held that a
plaintiff's dismissal of its trademark infringement suit, together with a
covenant not to sue the defendant, removed the district court's jurisdiction and barred the defendant's counterclaim of trademark invalidity.93

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Id.
17 U.S.C. § 109 (2012).
Id.
17 U.S.C. § 602(aX1) (2012).
Kirtsaeng, 133 S. Ct. at 1355.
See id. at 1357.
John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Kirtsaeng, 654 F.3d 210, 221 (2d Cir. 2011).
Kirtsaeng, 133 S. Ct. at 1355-56.
See id.
133 S. Ct. 721 (2013).
Id. at 725.
Id. at 732.
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Nike filed a trademark infringement action against Already alleging
that Already's Yums@ brand of footwear was confusingly similar to
Nike's Air Force 1@ brand of footwear. Already counterclaimed seeking
to cancel Nike's trademark registration for Air Force 1. Nike then
dismissed its complaint and provided Already with a covenant not to
sue. However, Already continued to pursue its counterclaim to
invalidate Nike's trademark registration, alleging that even with the
covenant not to sue, the mere existence of the trademark registration left
the impression that Already continued to infringe on the trademark.
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
dismissed the counterclaim, holding that there was no longer a
justiciable controversy, and the Second Circuit affirmed."
The United States Supreme Court unanimously affirmed the Second
Circuit's decision, holding that the "voluntary cessation" of enforcement
of the Air Force 1@ trademark registration via the covenant not to sue
destroyed jurisdiction." In effect, Already could no longer fear a
trademark action, and as a result there was no actual controversy for a
court to resolve." Importantly, the Court held that the covenant not
to sue was unconditional and irrevocable, and the convenant protected
Already, its distributors, and its customers." The Court's decision
reinforces the general rule that a plaintiff can affirmatively dismiss a
counterclaim by issuing a broad covenant not to sue in the trademark
realm.
Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google Inc.91 is not a case that has precedential
effect in Georgia, but instead is a case that was closely followed by the
intellectual property community for its potentially far-reaching
importance and effect on the publishing industry. Authors Guild
involved the question of what constitutes fair use of a body of works
under the United States Copyright Act.99 After a long history of
litigation, the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York held that under the fair-use doctrine of § 107 of the United
States Copyright Act,'o Google's practice of digitally copying books for

94. Id. at 725-26.
95. Id. at 727.
96. Id. at 726.
97. Id. at 723.
98. 721 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 2013).
99. Id. at 134.
100. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). Section 107 contains a list of purposes for which the
reproduction of a work may be considered fair, and thus, even though an infringement, not
actionable under the United States Copyright Act. Such fair uses are criticism, comment,
news reporting, teaching, scholarship, and research. Section 107 also sets out four factors
to be considered in determining whether or not a particular use is fair:
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its Google Books program does not violate the authors' copyrights in the
copied books.o0
Google initiated its Google Books project to scan the complete text of
potentially every book in the world. 102 Through Google Books, the
public can search for the books and view portions of the text. Google
Books only received permission to scan the books and make them
available to the public from the copyright owners of a small percentage
of the books. Authors Guild, on behalf of its member authors, sued
Google for copyright infringement. Google defended on the basis of the
§ 107 fair-use provisions of the United States Copyright Act. Ultimately,
the district court agreed and dismissed the case on a summary judgment
finding of fair use.o0
Using the four-factor test provided for in the United States copyright
laws to determine whether the Google Books project was fair use, the
court found the first, second, and fourth factors pointed to fair use, while
the third factor pointed away from fair use.'" For the first factor,
purpose and character of the use, the court found that Google's use does
not replace books, but instead adds a new dimension to books that is
transformative and is more educational, which pointed to fair use.'0o
For the second factor, the nature of the copyrighted work, the court
found that because the majority of the books scanned were non-fiction
books, this also pointed to fair use.o' For the third factor, amount and
substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as
a whole, the court found that because the entire work was scanned, this
pointed slightly away from fair use.' For the fourth factor, the effect
of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted
work, the court found that Google Books does not act as a replacement
for the copyrighted works because a user cannot read the entirety of the

(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted
work.
Id.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Authors Guild v. Google Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d 666, 669-70 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
Id. at 670; See http://books.google.com.
Authors Guild, 770 F. Supp. 2d at 666-71.
Authors Guild, 954 F. Supp. 2d 282, 291-93 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
Id. at 291.
Id. at 292.
Id.
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work on Google Books; because of this, Google Books should actually
enhance the market for individual books, which points to fair use.o8
Interestingly, it appears that the court, at least in part, based its fairuse finding on the public benefits Google Books potentially provides to
researchers, librarians, teachers, and students in fostering research and
preserving older books from degradation. Thus, while the author or
copyright owner has the right to cease publishing a book and to let it
fade into obscurity, there is a public benefit in preserving books to
"advance the arts and sciences."' 09
D. rade Secrets
Airwatch LLC v. Mobile Iron, Inc." 0 involved the question of whether, under the Georgia Trade Secrets Act (GTSA),"' the appearance and
functionality of software could be considered a trade secret."1 2 AirWatch sells software that permits secure mobile electronic messaging,
and Mobile Iron is a competitor. A Mobile Iron employee posed as a
representative of a fictitious company and obtained a free trial of the
AirWatch software under an end user license agreement that included
the provision that the end user would not perform competitive analysis
of the software. During the trial period, the Mobile Iron employee
contacted AirWatch several times with questions about how the software
worked.'
As often happens in surreptitious dealings, the Mobile Iron employee
mistakenly sent an email from his Mobile Iron address rather than from
the fictitious address, which AirWatch noticed, and AirWatch terminated
access and contacted Mobile Iron to address the issue. When the issue
could not be resolved to AirWatch's satisfaction, AirWatch sued Mobile
Iron asserting, among other things, a claim under the GTSA. Mobile
108. Id. at 292-93.
109. Id. at 293-94.
110. 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125817 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 4, 2013).
111. O.C.G.A. § 10-1-761(4) (2009).
Information, without regard to form, including, but not limited to, technical or
nontechnical data, a formula, a patter, a compilation, a program, a device, method,
a technique, a drawing, a process, financial data, financial plans, product plans,
or a list of actual or potential customers or suppliers which is not commonly
known by or available to the public and which information:
(A) Derives economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known
to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who can
obtain economic value from its disclosure or use; and
(B) Is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to
maintain its secrecy.
112. Airwatch, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125817, at *11.
113. Id. at *1-*3.
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Iron moved to dismiss, asserting that the software did not qualify for
trade secret protection because AirWatch had freely allowed access via
a trial and because the software was readily ascertainable through
proper means." 4
The court held that providing software to a third party under the
circumstances of the case-namely, to third party users for a limited free
trial-did not, per se, forfeit the trade secret status of the software."'
Importantly, the court noted that everyone to whom AirWatch had given
access to the software had the same end user license agreement with the
same agreement not to participate in competitive analysis of the
software." 6 Thus, because the court could not conclude that AirWatch's efforts to protect its alleged trade secret information were not
reasonable, the court held that AirWatch stated a claim for misappropriation of trade secrets under the GTSA."' In effect, the court reinforced the general rule that if the owner of a trade secret takes
reasonable steps to protect a trade secret, the owner of the trade secret
can state a cause of action even if access to the trade secret is provided
to a number of third parties under trial circumstances.
IV.

A WATCH LIST FOR 2014

The following cases and issues are likely to arise or be decided in the
coming year and may affect the intellectual property legal landscape.
Two cases that will be argued before the United States Supreme Court
in 2014 involve the award of attorney fees. In Highmark Inc. v. Allcare
Health Management Systems, Inc.,"'8 the United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari to decide whether a district court's exceptional-case
finding under the United States patent laws permitting attorney
fees"' is entitled to deference. 2 o Although the Federal Circuit did
find the case to be exceptional, the Federal Circuit did not defer entirely
to the district court, finding that the district court did err in finding the
case exceptional on one basis.' 2 ' In Octane Fitness,LLC v. Icon Health
& Fitness,Inc.,' the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari

114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
2012).
122.

Id. at *3-*6, *10.
Id. at *13.
Id. at *10-*11.
Id. at *16-*18.
134 S. Ct. 48 (2013).
35 U.S.C. § 285 (2012).
Highmark Inc., 134 S. Ct. at 48.
Highmark, Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys. Inc., 687 F.3d 1300, 1315 (Fed. Cir.
134 S. Ct. 49 (2013).
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to decide whether the Federal Circuit's test for determining whether a
case is exceptional under the United States patent laws 2 ' improperly
appropriates a district court's discretionary authority to award attorney
fees.' 24 Before the Federal Circuit, Octane Fitness sought to lower the
standard for exceptionality to "objectively unreasonable"; however, the
Federal Circuit concluded that there was no reason to revisit the settled
standard for exceptionality, which is clear and convincing evidence of
bad faith or at least gross negligence by the losing party.125 These
cases are of great interest to the litigation bar for obvious reasons.
In Medtronic Inc. v. Boston Scientific Corp.,2 ' the United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether a patentee bears the
burden of persuasion on infringement when a licensee in good standing
sues for a declaratory judgment of non-infringement.'2 7 The Federal
Circuit reiterated that in a normal declaratory judgment action in which
one party brings the action against the patent holder for a finding of
non-infringement, "[tihe substantive burden of proof normally does not
shift simply because the party seeking relief is a counterclaiming
defendant in a declaratory judgment action, . . . recognizing that a
declaratory judgment action of invalidity with an infringement
counterclaim is nothing more than an inverted infringement suit."'28
However, when the party bringing the declaratory judgment action is a
licensee of the patent at issue and is simply seeking to stop paying
royalties to the patent holder, there is no infringement, and the Federal
Circuit held that the patent holder does not bear the burden of proving
infringement.' 2 9
In Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank International,so the United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether an analytical
method implemented by a computer or by a link on the Internet is
The Federal Circuit sitting en banc
eligible for patent protection.'
found the method at issue ineligible for a patent, but a majority could
not agree on a standard for making such decisions.1 32

123.
124.
125.
2012).
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

35 U.S.C. § 285.
Octane Fitness, 134 S. Ct. at 49.
Icon Health & Fitness, Inc. v. Octane Fitness, LLC, 496 F. App'x 57, 65 (Fed. Cir.
133 S. Ct. 2393 (2013).
Id. at 2393.
Medtronic Inc. v. Boston Sci. Corp., 695 F.3d 1266, 1272 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
Id. at 1273.
134 S. Ct. 734 (2013).
Id. at *1.
CLS Bank Int'l v. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 717 F.3d 1269, 1273 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
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One of the long-standing judicial exceptions to the types of inventions
mentioned in Section 101 of the United States patent laws'" is that
an abstract idea can never be patented." That issue arises frequently
these days, especially with rapidly developing technology in computer
Alice International obtained patent protection for a
software.'a
method of exchanging financial instruments, with the aim of assuring
that when two parties have agreed to an exchange of currency or other
financial goods, the parties actually deliver on the deal. CLS Bank
International sued Alice International, claiming that the patent on this
system was invalid and unenforceable. Alice International counterclaimed for infringement of its patent rights. 13 6 The United States
District Court for the District of Columbia found the patent invalid,'
and the Federal Circuit reversed, finding that the computer implementation steps for that method were sufficient to justify granting a patent.'
In an en banc review, the court held that Alice International's
patent was not invalid but failed to agree on standards for determining
whether computer-implemented inventions are patentable.'
V. FINAL NOTES
The year 2013 was a banner year on the statutory side of intellectual
property with the enactment of the final provisions of the AIA.
Additionally, the courts heard and decided cases interpreting issues of
practical importance to the intellectual property practitioner. Many of
the decided cases provide additional insight into the notion that
intellectual property practitioners have to be even more careful in the
drafting of patents, licenses, and contracts. Fortunately, it appears that
2014 will provide more of the same, with a number of interesting cases
being granted certiorari by the United States Supreme Court.

133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

35 U.S.C. § 101.
See generally CLS Bank Int'l, 717 F.3d at 1277.
The issue also emerges in the context of biotechnology and computer hardware.
CLS Bank Int'l v. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 768 F. Supp. 2d 221, 223-24, 228.
Id. at 223.
CLS Bank Int'l v. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 685 F.3d 1341, 1355-56 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
CLS Bank Int'l, 717 F.3d at 1273.
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